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Abstract  
This article introduces the Girl Child Soldier Dataset (G-CSDS), which provides information on 
the number of girl soldiers and their functions (supporters or combatants) in rebel groups between 
1989 and 2013. The dataset can be easily combined with other data based on the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP), and we demonstrate its usefulness with descriptive statistics and a 
regression analysis that is informed by previous research on women’s participation in armed 
groups. Among other findings, our analysis suggests that there are crucial differences between girl 
combatants and those active in more supportive roles. We conclude that the G-CSDS provides a 
central platform of easily-accessible information that will be useful to scholars and practitioners 
working on civil conflict, human rights, armed groups, or demobilization, disarmament, and 
reintegration (DDR) programs. 
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Introduction 
According to UNICEF (2002) estimates, hundred-thousands of children participate – forced or 
voluntarily – in non-state armed groups1 in conflicts around the world. However, possibly due to 
the widely-held presumption that war is ‘men’s work’ (e.g., Brett, 2003: 1-2; Fox, 2004: 469; 
Mason, 1992; Mazurana et al., 2002; Park, 2006; Denov, 2008), girl soldiers have largely been 
neglected by academic work and the policy community (e.g., McKay, 2005; Park, 2006; Denov, 
2010). Especially before the 2000s, scholarship on child soldiers overwhelmingly reflected the 
experience of boys (McKay & Mazurana, 2004; Brett & Specht, 2004; Spellings, 2008; see also 
Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015). Girls associated with armed groups were typically treated as an 
addendum, mentioned only peripherally at best. 
It is, however, important to devote more systematic attention to girl soldiers for at least five 
reasons. First, studies suggest that up to 40 percent of some non-state armed groups active in 
recent African conflicts were girls (Mazurana et al., 2002; Denov, 2008: 814), making girl 
soldiering a notable phenomenon. Second, girls’ experiences are fundamentally different from 
those of boy soldiers (e.g., Mazurana & McKay, 2001; Mazurana et al., 2002; Park, 2006; 
Tonheim, 2014). The former frequently take care of different tasks than the latter (Park, 2006: 
321), and they do experience inequality, such as receiving less food or poorer health care in 
comparison to boy soldiers (Mazurana & McKay, 2001). Girls’ vulnerability, low status, and their 
gender also make them even more susceptible to widespread abuse (e.g., Mazurana et al., 2002: 
113). These differences are mirrored in the data this article introduces: patterns of girl soldier 
recruitment differ from those of boy recruitment (Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a,b). Our data suggest 
that out of the rebel-conflict-dyad periods using any child soldiers (around 74 percent), slightly 
more than half of them (about 63 percent) have used girls, too. That is, 37 percent of the rebel-
conflict-dyad periods in our data differ in boy-girl child soldier recruitment. 
                                                 
1
 We focus on rebel organizations as Fox (2004: 467) and Denov (2008: 814) argue that cultural norms and legal 
mechanisms largely discourage girl recruitment by state military organizations. 
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 Third, girl soldiers’ experiences differ from that of women in armed groups. Although they 
share the aspect of gender oppression (Thomas & Bond, 2015; Gentry & Sjoberg, 2015), girls 
might be more extremely affected due to their young age (Park, 2006). Additionally, girls are 
more vulnerable to sexual assault because of common fears of HIV/AIDS in the case of adult 
females, and may experience more reproductive health issues due to childbearing at a young age. 
Even after conflicts terminate, girls keep being peculiarly susceptible: once united with their 
families, girls are more often subjected to stigma and mocking for having been sexually ‘used’ 
(Tonheim, 2014). Fourth, girls may also not have the emotional or social resources to draw upon 
that women have developed to cope with the ordeals they face (Machel, 2001: 55; Park, 2006). 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the difference between women and girls is obvious in our data: using 
Thomas & Bond (2015) for the comparison, there are 47 African rebel-conflict-dyad periods with 
women soldiers, but only 41 out of them have girl soldiers. In addition, six rebel-conflict-dyad 
periods recruited women, but no girls at all, while there are nine rebel-conflict-dyad periods where 
girls were recruited, but no women.2 Finally, girls are commonly not considered in reintegration 
programs. This is partly because the international community is still poorly informed about the 
determinants of girl soldiering and the roles girls have within rebel groups (e.g., Mazurana et al., 
2002). Identifying and understanding these patterns can help tailoring programs to more 
effectively assist (former) girl soldiers in post-conflict societies and even during disputes (see also 
Basini, 2013). 
Most existing scholarship on girl soldiers has been primarily qualitative in nature, often limited 
to a set of prominent cases (e.g., McKay, 2005, 2008; West, 2000; Podder, 2011).3 Conflicts and 
armed groups in which no or few girl were involved are usually omitted (see Henshaw, 2016a: 
209), which induces selection bias and limits earlier findings’ generalizability. For example, 
omitting those cases with few or no girl soldiers elides the gendered dimensions of (non-) 
                                                 
2
 Due to the regional focus in Thomas & Bond (2015), these numbers are for Africa only. 
3
 An important exception is Mazurana et al. (2002; Mazurana, 2004), as discussed below. 
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participation as it is particularly these omitted cases that help understand the masculinization of 
rebellion or the feminization of staying home. This issue seems even more central, since it is 
plausible that conflicts without girl soldiers share similarities that could make their recruitment 
more difficult. Focusing solely on cases of girl soldiering does not allow us to discover these key 
constraining factors.  
One reason for the absence of systematic empirical work seems to be the lack of high-quality 
data. We seek to address this with the Girl Child Soldier Dataset (G-CSDS), one of the first 
comprehensive datasets on girl soldiers. Based on academic, IGO, NGO, government, and media 
sources, the G-CSDS provides information on the number and type of girl soldiers in all rebel 
groups from 1989 to 2013 as identified by the Non-State Actor (NSA) project (Cunningham, 
Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2013). The G-CSDS allows scholars and practitioners alike to address 
previously unexplored questions on the determinants of the recruiting of girl soldiers or fighters as 
well as the consequences and impact of girl soldiering. In the following, we describe the dataset 
and present some descriptive patterns. We also demonstrate its usefulness with a regression 
analysis that is informed by recent research on women’s participation in armed groups (Thomas & 
Bond, 2015).  
 
Child and girl soldiers: Definitions 
The definitions of ‘child’ and ‘child soldier’ are subject to considerable debate. It is often 
contended that childhood is a socially constructed category, which is both historically and 
culturally contingent (see Park, 2006). Despite cross-cultural variation, the almost universally 
ratified UN Cape Town Principles (UNICEF, 1997) and Paris Principles (UNICEF, 2000) define 
child soldiers as ‘any person below 18 years of age who is, or who has been, recruited or used by 
an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, 
messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members.’ Following this, 
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we define girl soldiering by rebel groups as the recruitment of females below the age of 18 by a 
non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed 
force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility (also Sundberg et al., 2012). 
This definition includes girls recruited for, e.g., sexual purposes and, therefore, not only refers 
to children with arms. Moreover, the definition comprises children who were forcibly recruited as 
well as those that joined ‘voluntarily.’4 This is especially important as girl soldiers are often 
perceived as ‘abductees’ or ‘passive objects, with no ‘agency’ to act or speak for themselves’ 
(Brett, 2004: 31). However, many girl soldiers identify themselves as volunteers and, as such, 
have agency.5 
 
The Girl Child Soldier Dataset (G-CSDS) 
Research on the determinants and consequences of child soldiering has recently intensified (e.g., 
Tynes & Early, 2015; Brett & Specht, 2004; Achvarina & Reich, 2006; Gates & Reich, 2010; 
Becker, 2010; Machel, 1996; Beber & Blattman, 2013; Haer & Böhmelt, 2016a,b). However, 
most studies have paid little attention to girl soldiers. Some notable exceptions are Mazurana et al. 
(2002) or McKay (2005) who examine why girls join armed groups. What is missing thus far, 
though, is systematic research on why girls are recruited by rebel organizations in the first place 
and why they are sometimes used on the battlefield and solely in supportive roles at other times. 
 Collecting information on child soldiers is a challenging task, even more so when focusing on 
girls. Rarely are the numbers of girls known, especially in the context of forced recruitment 
(Mazurana et al., 2002: 108). Moreover, girls often refrain from disclosing their experience out of 
shame and fear of retribution (Mazurana et al., 2002; McKay, 2008). Consequently, there is no 
cross-sectional dataset available that records information on the presence and roles of girls in 
rebel organizations. An important exception is Mazurana et al. (2002; extended by Mazurana, 
                                                 
4
 Of course, it is debated whether we can speak of ‘voluntary’ enlistment in the case of children.  
5
 For excellent illustrations of agency, see Utas (2005) on the Liberian civil war or Marks (2013) on the role of 
women as both perpetrators and victims of sexual violence during the civil war in Sierra Leone. 
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2004) who collected information on the presence of girl soldiers between 1990 and 2002. 
However, they only report whether the government, opposition, or paramilitary/militia forces in a 
country have recruited at any point in 1990-2002. This aggregated and time-invariant format 
makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the reasons why rebel groups recruit girls. 
With the aim to provide a more comprehensive dataset, we compiled the G-CSDS. These data 
rely on the structure of the NSA dataset (Cunningham et al., 2013). The unit of analysis in the G-
CSDS is the same as in the NSA: the conflict-dyad-period, i.e., a government is combined with a 
rebel group in one conflict episode in which the attributes of this dyad do not change. As soon as 
there is a change in any of the dyad’s parameters (e.g., the characteristics of the actors), a new 
observation is given. A conflict may involve more than one rebel organization and, hence, each 
separate rebel group forms a conflict-dyad with the government. Over the course of these periods, 
changes in girl soldiering can – and do – occur. Our coding of girl soldiers and their roles relies on 
independent reports from Child Soldiers International, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, country reports of the US State Department, the International Labor Organization, 
and various news and academic sources in different languages (Dutch, English, German, French, 
and Spanish). Coders made a concerted effort to validate the data and check for consistency. If no 
reports were found that confirmed the use of girl soldiers by a group, this organization was coded 
as having no female child soldiers. For all variables, we only considered participation within the 
context of a rebel group; girls on their own or who act in unorganized groups are not captured by 
our data. 
Although we took great care of ensuring accuracy of the collected data, potential sources of 
bias might persist. For example, advocacy groups have incentives to exaggerate the proportion of 
girl soldiers to raise attention. On the other hand, rebel groups could downplay their recruitment to 
avoid punishment by the international community. It is also likely that advocacy groups and news 
sources only report girl soldier usage by rebels that are well-known. Consequently, finding no 
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reports on girls may not necessarily mean that an armed group did not use girls. Hence, we may 
actually underestimate the presence of girl soldiers in rebel groups with our dataset. 
 However, when comparing the G-CSDS with the only other existing large-N dataset on girl 
soldiers (Mazurana et al., 2002; Mazurana, 2004), we identify three minor differences. First, 
Mazurana et al. (2002; Mazurana, 2004) coded some countries, such as Japan or South Africa that 
are not included in the NSA data. We then also do not have information on whether girls are 
present in non-state groups active in these particular countries. Second, Mazurana et al. (2002; 
Mazurana, 2004) indicate that opposition groups in Eritrea used girl soldiers. Yet, there was no 
conclusive evidence that the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the only opposition group recognized by the 
NSA data, recruited girls. Third, our data show that the National Transition Council (an 
opposition group in Libya) recruited girls, which differs from the coding in Mazurana et al. (2002; 
Mazurana, 2004). The reason for this discrepancy is that this group was active in 2011-2012, 
which is not covered by their data.  
 Mazurana et al. (2002; Mazurana, 2004) also have information on the role of girls within armed 
groups, listing countries in which girls served as fighters between 1990 and 2002. When 
comparing their information with our more detailed codings, we again identify some minor 
differences. First, our dataset contains some armed groups that recruited girls to perform combat 
functions, which are not included in Mazurana et al. (2002; Mazurana 2004). For instance, in 
Afghanistan (Taliban), Chad (Front Uni pour le Changement), and in the Chechen Republic, the 
G-CSDS reports that girls were involved in combat, while this is not coded in Mazurana et al. 
(2002; Mazurana 2004). This difference is primarily driven by the longer time period of our 
dataset. Second, in contrast to our data, Mazurana et al. (2002; Mazurana, 2004) have identified a 
few countries in which girls performed a combat function. For instance, we did not find 
information that girls in Spain or Iraq are used as fighters. This difference might be because our 
data focus on non-state groups and do not include government parties. In sum, however, we did 
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not identify major differences or a systematic bias. In the Appendix, we also discuss the 
differences between the G-CSDS and data on women’s participation in armed groups.6 
 
Variables of the G-CSDS 
The G-CSDS comprises three variables. Two of them measure girls’ participation in rebel groups, 
while the third one looks at their roles. First, Girl participation dummy is a binary variable 
receiving the value of 1 when a rebel group used any number of girls in any capacity (0 
otherwise). The second item, Girl participation ordinal, records the number of girls in comparison 
to the total number of children involved in a group on a three-point scale: we assign the value of 0 
if a rebel group in a conflict period did not recruit girls; the value of 1 if a rebel group recruited 
only a few girls, i.e., less than 15 percent of the total amount of child soldiers; and the value of 2 if 
a rebel group recruited ‘many’ girls, i.e., more than 15 percent of the total amount of child 
soldiers. The 15-percent threshold is based on Brett (2004), as it marks the last third of her 
estimation that up to 30 percent of rebel groups’ child soldiers may be girls. However, rebel 
groups were only categorized as having many girl soldiers if multiple sources indicated this.  
 Finally, we coded whether girls participated actively in combat roles (Girls in combat): when 
evidence suggested that girls directly fought in battle, a rebel group in a conflict period received 
the value of 1 (0 otherwise). The Appendix further elaborates on the coding procedures. 
  
Descriptive overview 
Between 1989 and 2013, we coded information on rebel groups’ girl soldier usage in 321 conflict-
dyad-periods. In the following, we discuss some descriptive patterns and demonstrate the G-
                                                 
6
 Henshaw (20016 a,b) collected data on women’s participation in 72 randomly chosen rebel groups from 1990 to 
2008. Thomas & Bond (2015) provide information on women in 167 armed groups in 19 African countries. The 
comparison with our data shows that some groups use girl soldiers, but not women. At the same time, there are very 
few groups, which apparently use women, but no girls. These differences are largely given by armed groups having 
specific policies concerning the recruitment of girls versus women. Additionally, there might be differences in 
defining ‘supportive roles’ across datasets. 
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CSDS’s usefulness for scholars and practitioners. First, our dataset points to a considerable 
variation in enlistment patterns by rebel groups and how they use girls. Around 52 percent of the 
rebels in all conflict-dyad-periods did not recruit any girl soldiers in 1989-2013 (Table I). For 
example, the Jamiat-i-Islami in Afghanistan refrains from recruiting girls. At the same time, 
around 10 percent of all conflict-dyad-periods are characterized by girl recruitment on a large 
scale (Table I). In the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, for instance, more than 15 percent of 
the total amount of child soldiers were girls. There is also functional variation: in only 18 percent 
of our cases, girls were active as combatants (57 out of all 321 conflict-dyad-periods). For 
example, Al Shabaab in Somalia solely uses girls in supportive roles such as cooking or sexual 
slavery. On the other hand, the Sendero Luminoso in Peru belongs to the 18 percent of our cases 
that have used girls as combatants. 
 
Table I. Distribution of girls in supportive and fighting functions 
 Frequency Percent 
No girl soldiers 167 52.02 
Girl soldiers 154 47.98 
   
     Few girl soldiers (<15%)       123      38.32 (79.87) 
     Many girl soldiers (>15%)         31        9.66 (20.13) 
   
     Girl in supportive roles         97      30.22 (62.99) 
     Girl fighters         57      17.76 (37.01) 
   
Total 321 100.00 
 
Percentages in parentheses refer to girl-soldier only sample, i.e., the 154 conflict-dyad periods in our data with girl 
soldiers 
 
Figure 1 and Table I further shed light on the difference between girl soldiers in supportive 
functions and those active in combat. The map highlights countries that had active rebel groups 
via the ‘maximum level’ of recruitment: (0) no conflict according to the UCDP data, (1) conflict, 
but no girl soldiers, (2) rebels had girl soldiers, or (3) rebels had girl fighters. Clearly, girl 
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soldiering is present all over the world. However, there are fewer countries in which rebels used 
girls as fighters as compared to those that use them in supportive functions (Table I): only about 
37 percent of all rebel groups in the conflict-dyad-periods with girl soldiers employ them as 
fighters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Girl soldiers and fighters in rebel groups: country overview 
Data pertain countries that host(ed) rebel groups. We display the ‘maximum level’ of conflict and girl recruitment 
over the entire time period 1989-2013. For example, if a rebel group is coded as ‘having recruited girl fighters’ only 
in one year since 1989, it is marked in green. 
 
Application 
We illustrate the usefulness of our data with a regression analysis on the factors influencing the 
recruitment of girls by rebel groups and what roles they fulfill. While we use either Girl 
participation dummy or Girls in combat as the dependent variable, the explanatory variables are 
based on Thomas & Bond’s (2015) study on women’s participation in armed groups. They argue 
that organizational attributes determine women’s presence in military organizations and test this 
with data on 166 violent political groups across 19 African countries in 1950-2011. Their 
explanatory variables capture both the demand for women in and supply to organizations.7 
                                                 
7
 We do not seek to ‘improve’ upon Thomas & Bond (2015), but merely present a different analysis (on girls as 
opposed to women). The purpose of the following exploratory application is exclusively to demonstrate the 
concept/usefulness of the newly compiled data. 
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 First, there is the rebel-group size. Since smaller rebel groups can hardly afford to lose 
supporters, the costs of internal discord resulting from conflict over incorporating girls is likely to 
be greater for smaller groups (Thomas & Bond, 2015: 490). Therefore, like recruiting women, we 
expect that smaller rebel groups are less likely to recruit girls. Based on the NSA data 
(Cunningham et al., 2013), we created a dichotomous variable distinguishing between relatively 
small (2-999 members; coded as 1) and larger rebel groups (coded as 0). 
 Second, Thomas & Bond (2015: 491) point to the importance of competition. On one hand, 
rebel leaders seek to be more inclusive in highly competitive environments, increasing the 
likelihood of recruiting girls. On the other hand, including girls could dissatisfy some members 
who then leave and join a rival group. To avoid this, competition might discourage women – and 
girl – recruitment. We use the NSA data (Cunningham et al., 2013) to create a binary variable that 
receives the value of 1 if more than two rebel organizations existed in a conflict environment (0 
otherwise). 
 Third, groups based on fundamentalist Islamic ideals often attempt to reinforce girls’ and 
women’s exclusion from public life and, therefore, are more reluctant to recruit them (Thomas & 
Bond, 2015: 494). We coded whether a rebel group is based on Islamic principles (1) or not (0), 
using Gleditsch & Rudolfsen (2015). We opted for this operationalization for groups’ gender 
ideology as Thomas & Bond (2015: 493) solely rely on public declarations that women are 
‘integral to their movement or their struggle aims to liberate women.’ That said, the effect should 
be similar. Furthermore, groups fighting for separatism are often less likely to attract popular 
support (Thomas & Bond, 2015). Hence, they may need to exploit alternate strategies to 
outnumber government forces, such as the recruitment of girls. To examine this, we include a 
variable from the NSA data (Cunningham et al., 2013) on whether a rebel group fights a 
secessionist conflict (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Additionally, rebel groups relying on 
terrorism will be more inclined to recruit people who are not suspected of subversive activities, 
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enhancing the ‘element of surprise’ (Thomas & Bond, 2015). Since girls are usually perceived as 
‘less threatening,’ the effect could be stronger for girls than adult females. We use the binary 
variable Terrorism from Cunningham et al. (2013) indicating that terrorism is a dominant conflict 
strategy (coded as 1; 0 otherwise). 
 Fourth, more inequality between men and women may be associated with a higher likelihood 
of girls joining armed groups. We consider a measure on women’s political rights in a country 
provided by Cingranelli, Richards & Clay (2014). This item ranges from 0 (women’s political 
rights not guaranteed by law) to 3 (rights guaranteed in both law and practice). It might also be 
that a lack of state security affects girls’ decision to enlist to rebel groups for protection 
(Achvarina & Reich, 2006). We account for this by using the Physical integrity rights index from 
Cingranelli et al. (2014). It ranges from 0 (no government respect for rights) to 8 (full respect for 
rights). Since girls may not have the emotional/social resources that women have developed 
(Machel, 2001; Park, 2006), the effect of both items could be more pronounced for girls. 
Fifth, children tend to join rebel groups more often in weaker states (Tynes & Early, 2015: 95). 
To capture this, we use the natural logarithm of a state’s GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002). 
Furthermore, more democratic forms of government could decrease rebels’ incentives to recruit 
children (Tynes & Early, 2015: 90f). We use the polity2 item from the Polity IV dataset. Finally, 
the longer the duration of a conflict-dyad-period, the higher the probability of child recruitment 
(Tynes & Early, 2015). We employ a count variable measuring the time (in years) elapsed since 
the start of a conflict-dyad-period until its end; this item is based on the UCDP dataset (Gleditsch 
et al., 2002). The effects pertaining to women and girls should be similar for these three variables. 
Model 1 in Table II focuses on Girl participation dummy as the outcome variable (girls used in 
supportive as well as combat functions), while Model 2 uses Girls in combat as the dependent 
variable. Since both outcomes are binary, we use logistic regression and cluster the standard errors 
at the country level. Substantive results are presented in Figure 2, where we show first differences. 
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These underlines that particularly smaller rebel groups are less likely to recruit girls; the 
likelihood of girl soldiering decreases by about 16 percentage points, while the risk of using girls 
as fighters drops by 11 percentage points when raising Size from its minimum to its maximum. 
 
Table II. Explaining rebels’ use of girl soldiers in civil war 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
 
Girls’ participation Girls in combat 
Small -0.75 -1.97 
 (0.42)* (0.81)** 
Competition -1.04 -0.82 
 (0.49)* (0.55) 
Women’s political rights  0.57  0.13 
 (0.29)* (0.43) 
Phys. integrity rights index -0.31  0.07 
 (0.12)** (0.11) 
Islam -0.51 -1.96 
 (0.41) (0.85)** 
Secessionist conflict -0.19 -1.27 
 (0.39) (0.71)* 
Terror  1.17  
 (0.72)*  
Duration  0.19  0.16 
 (0.04)** (0.04)** 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.40 -0.64 
 (0.20)* (0.29)* 
Democracy  0.04  0.15 
 (0.04) (0.05)** 
Constant  3.09  3.47 
 (1.76)* (2.60) 
Obs. 213 203 
Log pseudolikelihood -119.86 -68.35 
 
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Model 2 omits the item Terror due to perfect prediction. 
 
* significant at 5 percent; ** significant at 1 percent (one-tailed) 
 
Second, the more competition among groups, the less likely it is that we observe girl 
soldiering. This is supported by the negative coefficient of Competition in Model 1 as well as the 
first difference estimate in Figure 2 (-24.2 percentage points). Table II emphasizes moreover that 
there are crucial differences between girl soldiers in general and those that participate as 
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combatants. While both Women’s political rights and Physical integrity rights index exert a 
statistically significant impact on girl soldiering, this effect disappears as soon as we limit the 
dependent variable to girls in combat. While the influence of Physical integrity rights index is in 
the expected direction, Women’s political rights is associated with a positive sign, suggesting that 
gender equality increase the likelihood of girl soldiering. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. First differences 
Graph displays point estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals (horizontal bars). A first difference is the change 
in the probability that the outcome variable is 1 when observing a change from the minimum to the maximum of a 
specific explanatory variable while holding all other covariates at their median. The vertical red line signifies a first 
difference of 0. 
 
  Besides, while Islam is negatively associated with Girls participation, the estimate is not 
statistically significant. Focusing only on girls in combat functions, Islam reaches conventional 
levels of significance, though. A secessionist conflict agenda does only seem to matter for using 
girls in combat. At the same time, the result for Terror is in line with theoretical expectations, 
although we lack enough variance in terms of Girls in combat: Terror drops out of the model as 
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conflict-dyad periods characterized by terrorist campaigns (Terror=1) predict the non-recruitment 
of girl combatants perfectly. Finally, the longer a conflict episode, the higher the likelihood of girl 
soldiering.  
 GDP per capita (ln) is negatively associated with both rebels recruiting girls and using them as 
fighters. And while Democracy is statistically insignificant in Model 1, it exerts a positive and 
significant effect in Model 2. The impact disappears when disaggregating the regime-type variable 
into autocracy (-10 to -6), anocracy (-5 to 5), and democracy (6 to 10 on the polity2 scale) 
dummies, however: rebel groups operating in autocracies are less likely than those operating in 
democracies or anocracies to recruit girl soldiers (generally or as fighters), but one can hardly 
distinguish among the latter two forms of government.  
 While there are other issues to examine, including endogeneity affecting, e.g., duration and girl 
soldiering, our demonstration of how the G-CSDS can be employed highlights the potential these 
data have in addressing new research questions – and, considering Thomas & Bond’s (2015) 
results, that there are significant differences between women and girl recruitment of armed 
groups. 
 
Conclusion 
There has been no systematic analysis of which organizations use girls and in what kind of 
function. The G-CSDS, a new dataset on girl soldiers in rebel groups, addresses this shortcoming. 
While these data fill an important academic niche, this is only the beginning as several avenues 
for research can be studied with their help. Eventually, the dataset allows to investigate the 
conditions under which non-state armed groups use girls and what impact they have during 
conflict and on post-conflict stability. The data may further help to identify the underlying causes 
and the consequences of girl soldiering as they offer the necessary scientific background for 
policy evaluation and implementation programs. 
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For instance, the dataset can shed light on the so-called substitution argument by Wood (2010): 
armed groups with girl soldiers may perpetrate less sexual violence. Additionally, it will inform 
the discussion on the linkage between the ideological base of rebel groups and their recruitment 
patterns: girls could be especially likely to join leftist organizations due to their equality agenda. 
Or consider the support for rebel groups: girl soldiering is an abhorrent form of recruitment in the 
eyes of the domestic public and the international community (e.g., Biberman & Zahit, 2016). 
Consequently, the recruitment of girls by rebel groups can disproportionally affect the level of 
support. From a policy perspective, the G-CSDS shows that girl soldiers are not a rare ‘anomaly:’ 
girl soldiering occurs frequently, their use varies across organizations, and their experience in 
armed groups is multifaceted and complex as girls may be victims and perpetrators 
simultaneously. On the other hand, the data can inform reintegration programs’ abilities to address 
sexual violence and coerced participation in violence (see also Basini, 2013).  
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